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Introduction
The debate over Church-and-State relations in the United States is full of
conflicting interpretations. In 1947, with the 5-4 ruling of Everson v. Board of
Education, the Supreme Court linked the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
with the enforcement powers the Fourteenth Amendment extended to the federal
government. 1 This linkage extended the power of the Establishment Clause to include
local and state governments. This case, therefore, restructured subsequent debate about
the separation of Church-and-State.
The Everson case was part of a larger pattern of Constitutional incorporation in
mid-20th century. The Court did not dispute the extension of the Establishment Clause to
include all governments of the United States through the enforcement power of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court’s authority to incorporate different parts of
the Constitution for the betterment of the public welfare also was not disputed. At issue,
in this particular case, and in the whole Church-State issue, was the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Establishment Clause as part of the First Amendment. The Everson
decision was a landmark case. An analysis of the pressures that led to this decision is
critical to a true understanding of the Church-State issue. An analysis of these pressures
will give evidence of the events surrounding the decision and help to create the historical
context under which this decision was made, which will clarify the meaning of the role
that this decision has played in Church and State issues.
In the Everson case, the Court reaffirmed that the First Amendment provided for a
clear and distinct separation between the powers of Church and State. The Court was
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comprised of seven appointees from the Roosevelt administration, and two new
appointees by President Truman. 2 Despite the agreement that the First Amendment
clearly separated the Church and State, the Court was split on the extent of this separation
and what exceptions to this separation existed, if any.
Two main schools of historical thought emerged after 1947, as legal historians
explored the Establishment Clause and the effect of Everson. The non-preferentialist
school advanced a narrow view of the Establishment Clause as merely prohibiting one
faith from receiving preferential treatment from the government.3 The strict-separationist
school viewed the Establishment Clause in a broader sense. They saw the Establishment
Clause as clearly establishing absolute separation between Church and State.4
These two schools of thought built on the premise of original intent. Authors in
each school found documents written by the writers of the Bill of Rights to try and prove
the original meaning of the Establishment Clause. Due to the diversity of sources, and
disparate opinions of the "the Founders," authors in each school found evidence to
support their interpretations of the Establishment Clause in these "original" sources. This
traditional debate, however, ignores the larger issue of why this landmark case emerged
in 1947 and why it was so influential then and later. They both ignored political
pressures that encouraged the Court to consider this case, including such things as the
2
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continual struggle for power between the branches of government, as well as the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights, including the religious clauses, through the power of
the Fourteenth Amendment.5
A more promising line of inquiry for understanding the significance of the
Everson decision builds from the historical context in which this case was decided. Legal
historians cannot resolve the question of original intent. Historians can, however, restore
the context in which the Court acted in 1947. This paper examines the social and
political pressures at work in the late 1940s, when the Supreme Court heard and decided
the Everson case, and it addresses an area previous historians largely avoided in their
analysis of this case. To understand what the Supreme Court did in its 1947 Everson
decision, it is imperative to understand the “why” behind the decision. Political tensions
between the Executive and Judicial branches of government, as well as internal tensions
on the Court, helped propel the Everson case and related Church-State issues onto the
Court’s docket at that particular juncture in time. The Court addressed these issues at an
important time in the nation’s history, in the beginning of the Cold War, during the reign
of McCarthyism. This context makes it imperative to consider the case in relation to its
in time if we hope to truly understand the case.

The Everson Case
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The court case Everson v. Board of Education stemmed from a New Jersey state
law. The law required School Boards to use tax revenues to reimburse parents for the
cost parents incurred using public transportation for transporting their children to and
from school. This law applied to the parents of students who attended public schools, as
well as those who attended parochial schools. The Board of Education for the Township
of Ewing authorized a total of $8,034 to compensate parents for the cost of their
children’s transportation to school, of which $357.74 was paid to the parents of parochial
school children. 6
Arch Everson, a taxpayer of Ewing Township (near Trenton) denied, on
Constitutional grounds, the right of the Board of Education to reimburse the parents of
Catholic school children for the costs of transportation. The grounds under which
Everson filed suit were that the taxes being paid to individuals violated the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also argued that the law violated the First
Amendment in its provision prohibiting any “law respecting an establishment of
religion.” 7 The New Jersey State Court supported Everson’s contention, ruling that the
State law was in violation of the Constitution. The New Jersey Court of Errors and
Appeals reversed the lower court, stating that the law was in fact constitutional and did
not violate the Establishment Clause. The Federal Supreme Court confirmed this reversal
in its February 11, 1947 ruling Everson v. Board of Education. 8
The Federal Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that the New Jersey statute did not violate
the Constitution. Beyond that narrow finding, however, the majority of the Court
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affirmed that the Establishment Clause did indeed erect a barrier between the Church and
the State that should not be violated. The Court ruled, however, that in this instance, the
New Jersey law did not violate that separation. Justice Hugo Black wrote the majority
opinion. Black argued that the Establishment Clause meant more than the traditional
view that the government could not establish an official church. He argued that members
of any faith cannot be excluded from enjoying the common benefits of public society no
matter what their religion. According to the Court, to limit the reimbursement by the
School Board to only those parents whose children attended public schools would be, in
essence, a true violation of the Establishment Clause. If the State imposed such limits,
Black argued, it would breach the wall of separation imposing prejudicial restraint on a
member of a certain faith. 9
Justice Wiley Rutledge wrote a dissenting opinion that the entire minority
supported. His opinion stressed the minority’s view that they were in agreement with the
majority in recognizing a clear and high wall separating Church and State, but they
believed that the actions of the New Jersey law clearly and definitively violated the
Establishment Clause. Black's majority opinion, however, argued, “the First Amendment
has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and
impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it
here.” 10
Justice Black quoted one of the nation’s founding fathers, citing Thomas
Jefferson’s famous phrase “a wall of separation between Church and State.”11 Though
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the Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, ruling that the law was indeed
constitutional, it also reconfirmed that a distinct wall separated the two great powers of
Church and State. This concept established Everson as the foundation for future Supreme
Court interpretations of the Establishment Clause.

The Debate Over Church and State
The First Amendment of the Constitution included two components of religious
freedom: the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. The Establishment
Clause states simply, “congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.” 12 Historians continue to debate whether or not the Supreme Court, in its
Everson decision, contradicted the original intent of those who initially drafted the
Establishment Clause as one component of the First Amendment.13
The debate over the relationship between Church and State has a deep-rooted
history. Between 1787, when the Constitution was penned, and 1789, when the First
Congress sent the first twelve amendments to the states for ratification, the framers were
involved in a contentious debate over the proper relationship between government and
religion. Those involved in the ratification process were fearful that a governmentbacked religion might secure the power to persecute those who did not subscribe to their
particular doctrine. 14 Individuals involved in the creation of the new government and of
the First Amendment, including James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, hoped to separate
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these powers, thereby preventing the conglomeration of power found in England and
many of the thirteen colonies.
The debate over Church and State did not end with the inclusion of the
Establishment Clause in the First Amendment. The debate continued in the form of a
dispute over what the founders intended by the Establishment Clause, and in the present
circumstances, whether or not the Supreme Court, in the 1947 Everson case, adhered to
the original intent of the First Amendment in its interpretation of the Establishment
Clause.
This pre-occupation with original intent has blinded many historians to a deeper
significance of the Everson case, and it has also prevented scholars from considering this
case from within its own historical context. The pointed fight between two opposing
sides has diverted attention from why the Everson decision was itself originally written.
In their pre-occupation with the original intent of the Founders, historians have neglected
the original intent of the 1947 Court, which was concerned with political and social
pressures such as the doctrine of selective incorporation, as well as factionalism within
the Court, that led to the Everson decision.

The Two Schools of Historical Thought
In the debate over the meaning of the Establishment Clause, the nonpreferentialist school narrowly construes the meaning of the Establishment Clause.
Subscribers to this approach argue that the authors of the Establishment Clause intended
only to prevent the government from bestowing preferential treatment upon one
particular church or religious sect, and no more. The non-preferentialists, such as Robert

9
Cord and John Coughlin, argue that any further application of the Establishment Clause is
a gross exaggeration of the original intent. 15 Scholars of the strict-separationist school of
thought hold a broader view, arguing that the Establishment Clause created a barrier
between religion and government that could not be penetrated by any relationship
between these two groups. This latter group argues that the Everson case finally put into
correct perspective the original intentions of the writers of the First Amendment. This
argument appears in the writings of Leonard Levy, Frank Swancara, and Leo Pfeffer. 16
One non-preferentialist of note is Historian Robert L. Cord, who has argued that
the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent preferential treatment among religions
and that historical evidence supports the view that the Everson decision took the
Establishment Clause out of context. 17 In Separation of Church and State: Historical Fact
and Current Fiction, Cord argued that the interpretation of the Establishment Clause by
the Supreme Court in 1947 directly contradicted the intentions of the writers of the First
Amendment. Cord argued that the “high and impregnable wall” described by Justice
Hugo Black in the Court’s opinion in Everson, had no grounding in the original intent,
and that it contradicted the true objectives of the Establishment Clause.
Cord's work relied on the remote past, presenting evidence that refuted the 1947
ruling by the Supreme Court. The book did not address the political and social pressures
involved in the Supreme Court ruling of 1947. The historical evidence of letters and
records written during the Constitutional debates informed Cord's conclusions about the
intentions of the writers. Cord used evidence from the first American Presidents, those
15
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that helped to write the amendments as well as those who served in office shortly after
the amendments were made, in their management of religious issues. Cord argued that
the actions and interpretations of Presidents such as George Washington, John Adams
and James Madison do not match the later interpretations of the 1947 Court. 18 Their
actions, Cord concluded, clearly indicated that the Establishment Clause was not intended
to abolish all connection between religion and government, but merely to prevent the
Federal Government from bestowing preferential treatment on one particular religion.
Cord noted that Presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John
Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, and Martin Van Buren all “established” religious
schools in the form of subsidizing missionary work among Native tribes. 19
Cord, however, accorded these Presidents an authority not granted in the
Constitution: why do the interpretations of the Presidents hold more legitimacy than
Supreme Court decisions? On occasion, the actions of Presidents have been ruled
unconstitutional by the Federal Supreme Court. Cord used the actions of these Presidents
as evidence of what their views of the Establishment Clause were, and what their goal
was in the First Amendment. The Court considers only its own precedent, not the actives
of past Presidents, in its decisions. Whether correct or misguided, the actions of these
Presidents therefore are completely irrelevant to the deliberations of the Court.
Cord used the example of the Presidents as well as the literature associated with
the amendment-writing processes to conclude that the Everson decision veered sharply
from the intentions of the First Amendment. By looking at how these individuals viewed
their own amendment and their subsequent actions, Cord argued that one can understand
18
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what they thought when they wrote it, thereby clearly establishing the goals of the
Establishment Clause. 20 According to Cord, the prohibitions of the Establishment
Clause, according to Black's majority opinion, were complete fiction and in direct
contradiction to the true meaning and intention of the First Amendment as illustrated by
the historical evidence provided by primary historical documents, such as letters written
by the Framers of the Constitution as well as those involved in the ratification process,
and the recorded events of American history. 21
Cord argued his non-preferential interpretations of the Establishment Clause in
1982. Nine years later, another non-preferentialist, John J. Coughlin, argued that the
Supreme Court erred in its broad, sweeping interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
Coughlin argued that to correctly adhere to the original Constitution, the Supreme Court
and historians need to look back to the "true" intentions of the framers and the
implications of their frame of mind when they penned the First Amendment.22 This
search is a very lofty goal, given the many conflicting views of what the Establishment
Clause meant, even among those who wrote it.
Coughlin's work, like Cord’s, focused entirely on the intentions of the authors of
the First Amendment. He focused his rejection of the Everson decision partly on the
relationship between society and religion in the late 18th century. The influence of
religion on many of the authors of the Bill of Rights, argued Coughlin, is undisputed. It
was an integral part of society and education, and those who penned the Establishment
Clause accepted that fact; therefore, Coughlin argued, to consider any relationship
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between religion and government as prohibited by the First Amendment is a grievous
error.23 According to Coughlin, “the Framers never intended the Constitution to defile
the religious understanding of the human person that prevailed in U.S. education.” 24
Over the years, historians who embraced the views of non-preferentialism, among them
Cord and Coughlin, argued that the Everson case, in its deviation from original intent,
had this exact, heinous effect.
In stark contrast to the analysis of original intent by Cord and Coughlin, strictseparationist scholars such as historian Leonard Levy argued that the interpretation of the
Establishment Clause by the Everson Court was true to the original intentions of the First
Amendment. Levy contended that the preponderance of historical evidence supports this
broad, sweeping interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 25 Levy wrote The
Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment, in 1986, four years after Cord
published Separation of Church and State. Among historians of Constitutional Law
there was an internal battle over the interpretation of the Establishment Clause, and Levy
named Cord as his target. Levy lambasted non-preferentialists, among them Cord, who
questioned the Court’s reasoning in the Everson interpretation. 26 According to Levy, the
Establishment Clause had always been interpreted in a manner according to the true
intentions of the Founders of the First Amendment. To him, the only important aspect of
Everson was that it incorporated the First Amendment, through the power of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore expanded the protection of the “wall of
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separation” to include the governments of states and localities. 27 On this point, Levy
followed Cord's strategy of arguing from the foundation of original intent, but Levy
paradoxically faulted the non-preferentialists for relying too heavily on the original intent
of the authors of the Establishment Clause. The Constitution, he argued, is not a
document preserved completely in its original nature with an interpretation fixed for all
eternity with no change in meaning. It is a "living document" that changes over time, as
evident in the amendments made to it, and by the judicial interpretations of the original
wording. 28 Despite his adamant refutation of the doctrine of original intent, Levy relied
on that doctrine as much as the non-preferentialists.
The strict-separationist school originated long before Levy wrote in 1986. In
1950, three years after the Everson ruling, Frank Swancara wrote, The Separation of
Religion and Government: The First Amendment, Madison’s Intent, and the McCollum
Decision: A Study of Separationism in America. According to the forward written by
Godfrey Von Hoffe, the book's purpose was to defend separatism from an assault by
those who wished to see the powers of the State and the Church fused. 29
Swancara's book clearly defended the position of strict-separation and the
dissenting opinion written by Justice Rutledge for the Everson case. To Swancara,
Rutledge's view that the First Amendment erected a high wall that would be violated by
any connection between the Church and the State accurately reflected past interpretations
of the Establishment Clause by the Supreme Court. 30 With Swancara writing so soon
after the ruling and within the context of McCarthyism, his view of public reaction is

27

Ibid, 149
Ibid
29
Swancara, iv
30
Ibid, 1
28

14
important to this study. According to Swancara, the average citizen was in agreement
with the Supreme Court decisions that upheld a strict wall, and they endorsed this view of
the Establishment Clause. 31
Swancara also argued that the Court's purpose in Everson was merely to expand
the freedoms of the Establishment Clause and extend its protections to the states as well
as the federal government. Because Everson, in essence, changed nothing on the national
level, Swancara argued it was not in need of defending. This is important to the analysis
of this historiographic debate: shortly after Everson, legal scholars argued that the
Everson case changed only the incorporation of the freedoms defined under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Though Swancara brought original intent into his argument, it
was not the crux of his defense. His primary focus was that a defense of Everson and
McCollum(1948)32 was unwarranted, because the actions of the Court were in agreement
with their previously held view of the Establishment Clause, and that Everson merely
expanded the powers of that clause to the states.
Two years after Swancara’s insistence that strict-separation was the true meaning
of the Establishment Clause, Leo Pfeffer published Church State and Freedom. 33 Pfeffer
looked at the broader issue of Church-and-State separation. He looked at how other
countries had dealt with the issue as well as the history of the issue, within the United
States.34 He then examined the actual religious clauses of the First Amendment. He
considered original intent, not in light of Everson, but on a broader scale. According to
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Pfeffer, “in the minds of the fathers of our Constitution, independence of religion and
government was the alpha and omega of democracy and freedom.” 35
Pfeffer followed Swancara's argument that the true issue and impact of Everson
was that it incorporated the Establishment Clause with the enforcement power of the
Fourteenth Amendment. He also stressed that the decision reaffirmed the Court's view
that the First Amendment “prohibited the government from making laws that aid all
religions as much as laws that aid one religion.” 36 In this analysis, Pfeffer grasped the
crux of the matter. Pfeffer and Swancara, writing shortly after the Everson decision,
seemed clear on the meaning and power of the Establishment Clause, and the Everson
decision. Historians in the 1980s, however, returned to original intent and lost sight of
these earlier arguments.
Later Supreme Court decisions also help clarify the significance of Everson and
the context in which it evolved into a landmark case after 1947. Through the decades of
the 50s and 60s, majority opinions frequently cited the Everson case, as did dissenting
opinions. In these opinions, the Court maintained that Everson merely defined the
separation already present between the Church and the State, and they often sought to
expand that definition. In the 1952 Supreme Court decision, Zorach v. Clauson, Justice
Douglas acknowledged Everson in the majority opinion and wrote,
There cannot be the slightest doubt that the First Amendment reflects the
philosophy that Church and State should be separated. And so far as interference
with the ‘free exercise’ of religion and an ‘establishment’ or religion are
concerned, the separation must be complete and unequivocal. 37
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Beyond the majority opinion in Zorach, the dissenting opinion by Justice Black,
with Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurring, also fully recognized the effect
and power of Everson. Justice Black wrote, “I mean also to reaffirm my faith in
the fundamental philosophy expressed in McCollum and Everson.” 38 The general
philosophy of Everson was their agreed standard for defining separation of
Church and State.
Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote a dissenting opinion in the 1958 Supreme
Court decision Beilan v. Board of Public Education, in which he recognized that
Everson established freedom of religion as a clearly guaranteed liberty. 39 In this
manner, Warren substantiated and affirmed the decision of the Court ten years
before. Four years later, in the 1962 decision of Engel v. Vitale, Justice Black
wrote a majority opinion that linked the Everson view of the Establishment
Clause with earlier arguments by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson affirming
the clear prohibition of any connection between the Church and the State. 40
The view that Everson affirmed separation between Church and State
dominated the Court opinions throughout the second half of the century. Often,
the Supreme Court seemed unsure of exactly how clearly the Everson case
defined that separation. In the 1971 decision of Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme
Court laid the groundwork for the separation identified in Everson. 41 Chief
Justice Warren Earl Burger wrote in that 1971 opinion, “Candor compels
acknowledgement, moreover, that we can only dimly perceive the lines of

38

Ibid, 317-318
Beilan v. Board of Public Education, School District of Pennsylvania. 357 U.S. 399, 412
40
Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421, 428
41
Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602
39

17
demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.” 42 With
this in mind the Court expanded Everson and created the Lemon test to measure
whether or not relations between Church and State violated the First Amendment.
Though the Justices that made up the Court changed through the years, the
Court continued to support the Everson decision. The Court recognized Everson
as the landmark case that defined the separation between Church and State
through the 1970s. In the per curiam decision of Buckley v. Valeo in 1975, the
Court cited Everson, recognizing that, “the government may not aid one religion
to the detriment of others or impose a burder on one religion that is not imposed
on others, and may not even aid all religions.” 43 These later views by the Court,
citing the Everson precedent, clarify the intentions of the 1947 decision. The
Supreme Court clearly recognized the wall of separation which prohibited
interactions between Church and State, but later Courts continued to recognize the
debate, unsure of how absolute that separation was. These later Courts began to
redefine and expand Everson.

The Blinding Obsession with Original Intent
Both non-preferentialists and strict-separationists view original intent as the
primary measure of the 1947 Everson ruling. However, to evaluate Everson only in the
context of documents written around the time of the ratification of the Constitution
42
43
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ignores the nature of the Supreme Court and the contemporary context of its decisions.
Regardless of the original intent of the Framers, the Court acted in the context of
contemporary concerns in 1947. The authors of the Constitution recognized the
important need for adaptation and therefore included a mechanism for amendments in the
document itself. The Court also acknowledged the animation of the Constitution in its
doctrine of Judicial Review, beginning in 1803 with Marbury v. Madision.44 With the
doctrine of judicial review, the Court assumed a direct role in adapting the Constitution to
contemporary circumstances.
To fully grasp the issue of the relationship between Church and State in the latter
part of the twentieth century, therefore, historians must step back from the narrow focus
on original intent to consider the context of the decade of the 40s and the Supreme Court
decision that transformed the meaning of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment as interpreted in the Supreme Court rulings since Everson.

Politics of 1947
The overall context of 1947, including the makeup of the Supreme Court, political
changes that had recently occurred, the postwar economy, the social implications of
liberalism, and the beginnings of the Cold War all influenced the 1947 Everson decision.
The Second World War had ended less than two years before, and President Truman was
still adjusting to the governing legacy FDR had left behind. The Court that Truman’s
administration faced was a remnant of Roosevelt’s Administration, complete with their
internal bickering. This vestige of Roosevelt’s legacy was a Court focused on selective
incorporation and civil rights, important focuses of the Everson decision.
44
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During the Great Depression, the Roosevelt Administration reconstructed the
American government and its Courts, dramatically shifting the relationship of the
government within the great society. The New Deal built on the premise that the state
had a duty to encourage social and economic justice in the interest of the public, with an
emphasis on promoting stability and harmony among conflicting interests. 45 Young
idealistic lawyers flocked to Washington to join the fight for this "new liberalism", and
FDR found support in many areas. This did not, however, include the Federal Courts,
especially the Supreme Court. FDR found great opposition within the Supreme Court.46
By 1936, the Supreme Court had struck down or significantly limited the power
of the majority of New Deal legislation, rendering the New Deal utterly ineffective. 47 To
counteract the power of the Supreme Court to limit New Deal programs, the Roosevelt
Administration proposed a “judiciary reorganization bill”, which would have changed the
makeup of the Supreme Court, increasing the number of justices on the Court. 48 This
“Court packing” bill never had much chance of being passed, but it had a great impact on
the role of the Supreme Court in the following decades, in that it changed the direction
and focus of the Supreme Court. As the judicial and executive branches struggled for
power, the Supreme Court turned its focus to civil liberties, while the Roosevelt
administration focused on economic issues.
FDR's reorganization bill prompted the Court to move more in the direction of
considering social issues, such as Everson, rather than the economic issues of Roosevelt's
programs. Constitutional historians refer to this shift as the Supreme Court revolution of
45
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1937. 49 The cases involved in this revolution began with the case of West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, where the Court made it known that their focus would shift away from the
constitutional question of economic regulation and focus instead on the protected
guaranteed rights of individuals; those rights that were granted to all citizens through the
Fourteenth Amendment. 50 This new focus on civil liberties was intended by the Court to
shift the influence away from the Executive branch and to bring more power and control
to the Supreme Court in their continuing struggle against the Roosevelt Administration.
The Supreme Court thereafter avoided directly confronting FDR and began to focus on
the issue of personal liberties, which had become increasingly more important since
World War I. The Supreme Court’s shift in this era is vital to an understanding of the
Everson decision. The Everson decision was merely the Court’s continuance of selective
incorporation.
In the 1937 Supreme Court decision Palko v. Connecticut, 51 Justice Benjamin
Cardoza wrote for the Court saying that any fundamental right guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights was incorporated under the power of the Fourteenth Amendment to include the
regulation of States, not just the Federal Government. He defined a fundamental right as
that which is essential to the maintenance of ‘ordered liberty.’ 52
The Supreme Court gained power in this era with the doctrine of selective
incorporation. According to historian Melvin Urofsky, the Constitution did not give
definitive provisions in what should be applied to states. The judges had to determine
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what they viewed, and what legal historians viewed to be a fundamental right. 53 With
this new focus, the Supreme Court embarked on a quest, which continued into the era of
the Vinson Court, for “total justice”: the protection of individual liberties. 54 It was this
quest, not a misguided interpretation of the First Amendment that led directly to the
Court’s decision in Everson.

Selective Incorporation and Supreme Court Strife
The Supreme Court's doctrine of “selective incorporation” began a new era of
jurisprudence. Some opponents of the Court viewed incorporation as an over extension
of the Court’s role. Conservatives of political and legal circles argued that the Court had
usurped power that justly belonged to the States, and that it had turned itself into a
legislating body, by which they exceeded their Constitutional authority. 55 According to
legal historian Kermit Hall, some law professors of the time saw the extension of civil
liberty protection as the Supreme Court’s attempt to, “usurp legislative power, with
distorting the meaning of federalism, and with substituting their values for the original
intentions of the Framers.” 56 Who were these men who some argued were undermining
the very nature of the federalist system?
Between the Supreme Court of 1937 and the Everson ruling one decade later, the
makeup of the Court changed drastically. By the time Roosevelt died in 1945, he had
filled the vacancies of the Supreme Court with people sympathetic to his political
philosophies. He appointed an entirely new Supreme Court, with the solitary exception
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of Chief Justice Harlan Stone. Stone had served on the Court since 1925, having been
appointed by President Coolidge. 57 Chief Justice Stone died on April 22, 1946. This left
President Truman in the unique position of having to appoint a Chief Justice to a Court
made up almost exclusively of Roosevelt appointees. Truman was an inexperienced
foreign diplomat, and though this is seemingly unrelated to the Supreme Court it had a
great deal to with the political and social undercurrents of the decade. 58 The uneasiness
of Truman’s presidency had a great impact on the Court and the decisions it made. He
ultimately appointed Fred Vinson, a member of both Roosevelt’s and Truman’s cabinets,
who presided over the Court that heard the Everson case. 59
There was great internal strife on the Supreme Court in 1946. This internal strife
had a great influence on Truman’s appointment of Vinson, as well as the Court’s decision
in Everson. FDR had wanted to appoint Robert Jackson as Chief Justice following the
death of Chief Justice Hughes, prior to World War Two. Justice Felix Frankfurter,
however, convinced FDR to appoint a more conservative man than Justice Jackson, to
serve as Chief Justice, given the impending war and their need for support. FDR
appointed Harlan Stone Chief Justice, and gave Stone’s seat as Associate Justice to
Jackson. FDR promised Jackson the Chief Justiceship at the retirement of Stone. This
was clearly a point on the mind of the Court when it came time for Truman to appoint the
new Chief Justice. However, FDR was dead, and Truman did not feel that Jackson could
unite the splintered court. 60
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The strife within the Court was a huge issue. A reporter for the Washington Star
reported the internal contentions of the Court on May 16th. She reported that the Court
had been fractured since Black and Jackson’s fight over Jewell Ridge. She reported that
if Truman appointed Jackson as Chief Justice, both Justices Black and Douglas would
retire. 61 One month later, Truman named Fred Vinson as Chief Justice.
Beyond the splintered Court, lingered the liberal legacy of Roosevelt. The liberal
tendencies of the justices continued long after FDR, and were replayed on the Vinson
Court and, subsequently, in the 1947 ruling of Everson. However, the question arises, if
this court was so liberal, why did the decision uphold the New Jersey State Law requiring
the reimbursement of bus fares paid by parents to get their children to parochial schools?
There are several possible reasons for the Supreme Court’s decision to hear this
case. In 1946, when the Everson case was heard, the Supreme Court had already
determined that its primary purpose was to incorporate federally guaranteed liberties to
be applicable to local and State governments. This movement of selective incorporation
was intended to extend the Supreme Court’s power. Given this context, it is apparent that
it was not the issue of Church-and-State, but the incorporation of the guaranteed right
against government-established religion. This is a vital point that is sorely missing from
most historical analyses of the Everson decision.
The Supreme Court, in 1947, followed the policies of selective incorporation and
furthered the protection of individual rights while advancing the power of the Court itself.
Justice Felix Frankfurter supported Cordozo’s position of incorporation, while Justice
Hugo Black argued that the Fourteenth Amendment actually incorporated all of the Bill
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of Rights. 62 Justice Black and Douglas developed a view of jurisprudence that privatized
First Amendment rights. They argued extensively for an “absolutist” interpretation of the
Bill of Rights protections, saying that the Bill of Rights barred all government
interference. 63 These “absolutist” views extended to the First Amendment especially the
Establishment Clause.
These were the issues dividing the fractured Court that sat in judgment of the
Everson case. Agreement and solidarity were far from the minds of the justices as they
considered the reach of the Establishment Clause; however, they all agreed there was a
clearly defined barrier between the Church and the State. The majority opinion stated,
“The meaning and scope of the First Amendment, preventing establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, in the light of its history and the evils it was
designed forever to suppress, have several times been elaborated by the decisions of this
Court prior to the application of the First Amendment to the states by the Fourteenth.” 64
Rutledge argued a similar view in the minority dissenting opinion. In the first paragraph
of his dissenting opinion, Rutledge argued, “Neither so high nor so impregnable today as
yesterday is the wall raised between church and state by Virginia’s great statute o
religious freedom and the First Amendment, now made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth.” 65
This internal conflict over what should be incorporated by the Fourteenth
Amendment was the issue that consumed the Court in the Everson case. The Court did
not debate the "original intent" of the Constitution's Establishment Clause. The Justices
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all agreed that the Clause erected what they termed, “a wall of separation between
Church and State.” The simply disagreed on whether this protection was incorporated by
the Fourteenth Amendment, and if it was protected, how intense was the protection, or
“how high the wall”.

Social Implications of Everson
Public reactions to the Everson case are important because the decision actually
enhanced the government’s ability to interfere with religion. This view is contradictory
to the usual explanation of Everson, which argues that the Supreme Court singlehandedly erected a large wall of separation. The magazine U.S. News and World Reports
wrote about the case ten days after the decision was handed down. 66 The article argued
that the case, as described by the majority’s opinion, maintained religious separation by
providing that the government could not discriminate based upon a person’s faith. The
article then went through the background of Supreme Court decisions that set up the
relationship between Church and State. 67 According to the article, the decision blatantly
supported the government's interaction with and interference in religious affairs, violating
the Establishment Clause. 68
Time Magazine reported a much different view of the Everson decision.
According to this magazine, the Court was unable to solve anything in regard to the longstanding issue of the Church-State issue. The most interesting point in this magazine
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article was the author's view that the Supreme Court was incapable of solving anything
and had only proved that the issue of Church and State was far from resolved. The article
predicted correctly, that the issue would be before the people for a long time to come. 69
This report also discussed the impact that this decision had on states, recognizing the
incorporation of the Establishment Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. 70
Though these articles show two varying representations of the social
comprehension of the Church-State issue and the power of the Establishment Clause,
they help to explain the future trouble with the interpretation. These two different views,
presented in two very prominent magazines, showed that there was no unifying view of
the impact or power of the Everson decision. These socially constructed views of the
decision help to put this vital case into the proper contemporary context.

Conclusion
What is clear from any analysis of the Everson decision and the overall scope of
the Establishment Clause, is that over the years this issue has been hotly debated. What
has been missing from the general analysis of the Everson case has been the
contemporary issues surrounding the decision and influencing judicial priorities. The
Everson case cannot be looked at only in terms of the original intent of the framers of the
First Amendment.
What is more important than whether or not the Court’s decision in Everson
adhered to the intentions of the First Amendment, is the fact that the Supreme Court did
make a decision with Everson. Why did they choose to make this decision? Was it their
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intention to forever change the meaning of the Establishment Clause? The evidence,
taken in context, suggests not. The intentions of the Supreme Court are found in the
historical context surrounding the actual decision.
President Franklin Roosevelt’s Court packing bill of 1936 had a direct impact on
the state of politics in 1947 and the role of the Supreme Court. The Court changed its
focus in 1937 to move away from their focus on Roosevelt’s economic issues, and to
focus more on social issues and Civil Rights. This Supreme Court Revolution of 1937
led to the social and political conditions present in the Everson case.
The Supreme Court had gained significant power as it began to interpret the
extent of the Bill of Rights through the doctrine of selective incorporation. This focus on
incorporating fundamental rights under the Fourteenth Amendment was a critical factor
in the Court's decision to consider Everson in 1947. The Court was only marginally
interested in the meaning of the Establishment Clause. The Court, however, wished to
apply the Establishment Clause to the States, thereby extending the Court's power in the
face of a Constitutional challenge from FDR and Truman. They were merely continuing
on the pattern of incorporation when they ruled as they did in Everson. The majority
opinion, as well as that of the dissenters, clearly indicates that the issue was incorporation
and not the fundamental principle of the Church-State issue. Later historians erroneously
reached back to original intent in an effort to explain this case, but it was the political and
social context of the decision that held the true meaning and influence of the Everson
decision.
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